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Abstract. We introduce and discuss optimal control strategies for kinetic models for wealth distribution in
a simple market economy, acting to minimize the variance of the wealth density among the population. Our
analysis is based on a finite time horizon approximation, or model predictive control, of the corresponding
control problem for the microscopic agents’ dynamic and results in an alternative theoretical approach
to the taxation and redistribution policy at a global level. It is shown that in general the control is able
to modify the Pareto index of the stationary solution of the corresponding Boltzmann kinetic equation,
and that this modification can be exactly quantified. Connections between previous Fokker–Planck based
models for taxation-redistribution policies and the present approach are also discussed.
1 Introduction
Any society with a growing reliance on capital experiences
an increasing concentration of wealth, which leads in gen-
eral to a marked social inequality. How to reduce these
social inequalities in capitalistic countries is a debated
issue. The usual government policies are to use propor-
tional taxation, with the expectation that a progressive
tax system would prevent excess concentration of wealth.
A recent approach to this relevant economic question can
be found in Piketty [1], whose main conviction is that the
effect of the tax on capital income is not only to reduce
the total accumulation of wealth, but to modify the struc-
ture of the wealth distribution over the long run. In other
words, a confiscatory tax on high incomes combined with
a progressive tax on the value of the capital is viewed by
Piketty as the only way to prevent the natural tendency
of capitalism to head towards excessive inequality.
As a matter of fact, long term predictions on economic
systems are very difficult to justify, and a serious debate
would require a rigorous analysis based on well-established
models of wealth distribution. In this developing area of
research, mathematical modeling of economic systems has
had interesting advances in recent years [2–5].
Starting from the pioneering studies of Angle [6], most
of these models sink their roots into statistical mechan-
ics [7,8], and are based on methods borrowed from the
kinetic theory of rarefied gases and the Boltzmann equa-
tion [9,10]. The main original motivation at the basis
of this modeling was to understand the possible rea-
sons of formation of heavy tails in the distribution of
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wealth, as predicted by the economic analysis of the
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto [11].
One of the kinetic models of wealth distribution able
to reproduce the formation of Pareto tails on the basis of
few physically plausible hypotheses has been introduced
in 2005 in [12]. There, the evolution of wealth has been
based on binary trades modeled to include the idea that
wealth changes hands for a specific reason: one agent
intends to invest their wealth in some asset, property
etc. in possession of their trade partner. Typically, such
investments bear some risk, and either provide the buyer
with some additional wealth, or lead to the loss of
wealth in a non-deterministic way. An easy realisation
of this idea consists in coupling the saving propensity
parameter [13,14] with some risky investment that yields
an immediate gain or loss proportional to the current
wealth of the investing agent. Leaving the details of the
microscopic trade to Section 2.2, we recall here that the
model for wealth distribution introduced in [12] revealed
to be very flexible with respect to the addition of further
economic aspects, including the possibility of studying
the effects of taxation and redistribution [15–17], the
role and consequences of the addition of a parameter
describing agent’s knowledge [18], and the possibility to
use the kinetic interaction operator to construct suitable
equations of hydrodynamics [19,20].
Going back to the problem of capitalistic societies and
wealth inequality, it is interesting to remark that the
numerical simulation of the evolution of the kinetic model
for wealth and knowledge developed in [18], led to the
conclusion that the unequal distribution of knowledge in
a multi-agent society is itself a cause of an unequal distri-
bution of wealth among agents. Other aspects of wealth
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inequality and surplus theory have been recently analysed
from the mathematical point of view [21], with the aim
to find a relationship between agents’ risk aversion and
inequality of incomes. These studies clearly outline the
importance of resorting to mathematical modeling to test
and eventually verify economical hypotheses.
In this paper, we will discuss a possible alternative
to the standard taxation and redistribution rules, which
relies on a suitable control applied to the microscopic
trades describing the wealth distribution of the multi-
agent system. Recent applications of control problems to
kinetic models with binary interactions describing opin-
ion formation can be found in [22,23] (cf. also [24] for an
exhaustive review). Indeed, the possibility to effectively
exercise a control on opinion and to evaluate the impact
of modern communication systems, like social networks,
to the dynamics of opinions, is a challenging problem of
increasing importance.
More precisely, we assume the existence of a policy
maker (a government or a local administrator) that applies
a suitable control process to each economic interaction
with the aim to minimize a given cost functional measur-
ing the wealth inequalities in the system. This control acts
as an agent dependent taxation/redistribution dynamic
and, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed conserva-
tive over the whole set of agents so that the total amount
of wealth remains unchanged. The resulting constrained
dynamic takes the form of an optimal control problem
which, for a large set of agents, turns out to be compu-
tationally prohibitive due to its intrinsic complexity and
therefore approximate solution are sought even if subop-
timal. Among various possible approaches here, following
[22,23], we apply a finite time horizon strategy based on
model predictive control. In the simpler case of instanta-
neous control the problem can be solved explicitly giving
rise to a feedback control that can be embedded in the
microscopic system.
By considering binary interactions, the application of
this feedback control can be shown to change the sav-
ing propensities of the agents, which induces a smaller
variance for the density of wealth of the population. For
the binary dynamic introduced in [12] the corresponding
feedback control originates a Boltzmann equation whose
stationary states, compared to the original uncontrolled
model, have a larger Pareto index. An explicit result
in the direction of Piketty’s opinion [1] is that, in the
quasi-invariant interaction limit, among others, we can
recover the same Fokker–Planck equation resulting from
a standard taxation and redistribution process [15,16].
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce the microscopic model in the opti-
mal control setting. For this model we derive the explicit
feedback control in a finite time horizon approximation
and focus on the binary interaction case. Section 3 is
devoted to the study of the corresponding kinetic models.
We focus on the CPT model [12] and show that the action
of the control is capable to increase the Pareto index of
the corresponding wealth distribution, thereby reducing
inequalities. To have a further insight in the stationary
states of the system, in Section 4 we pass to the limit
controlled Fokker–Planck equation and show how it can
be reinterpreted as a taxation-redistribution model. Some
numerical simulations which confirm our analysis are also
reported.
2 Optimal control of wealth inequalities
2.1 A microscopic model with control
Let us consider the microscopic evolution of the wealths
of N agents, where each agent’s wealth wi, i = 1, . . . , N,
evolves according to the following first order dynamical
system
w˙i(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij(wj − wi) + ui, wi(t = 0) = wi,0 ≥ 0.
(1)
In (1) the nonnegative constants aij define the exchange
parameters of the trades and the ui’s are control terms. In
general, to ensure the positivity in time of the wealth vari-
ables, it is assumed that the exchange parameters satisfy
aij < 1 for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The controls ui act in order to redistribute wealth with
the aim to decrease the variance of wealth among agents.
This can be achieved by minimizing the functional
arg min
u∈U
J(w, u) =
1
2
∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
Lj(w) + ν|uj |2
)
dt, (2)
where U is the space of admissible controls, w =
(w1, . . . , wN ), u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and Lj(w) is a target cost
functional which measures the level of wealth inequalities
in the system.
An example is given by
Lj(w) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|wj − wk|m, m ≥ 1, (3)
where for m = 2 we have a classical quadratic cost func-
tional which corresponds to minimize the variance of the
wealth among all agents.
The constant ν > 0 is a selective penalization parameter
which takes into account that we may want to apply differ-
ent taxation rules to different level of incomes. As we shall
discuss later on, since the control essentially acts on inter-
actions among agents of the system, the constant ν can
be assumed to depend on the frequency of exchanges. In
this way, the control u can be understood as the external
action of a government which aims to reduce inequali-
ties, by acting on exchanges, through wealth-dependent
taxation and redistribution among agents.
Problems (1)–(2) can be reformulated as Mayer’s prob-
lem and solved by dynamic programming or Pontryagin’s
maximum principle [25,26]. However, the main drawback
relies on the fact that the equation for the adjoint vari-
able has to be solved backwards in time over the full time
interval [0, T ]. In particular, for large values of N the
computational effort becomes prohibitive. Also, assuming
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u = A(x) where A fulfills a Riccati differential equa-
tion cannot be pursued here due to the large dimension
of A ∈ RN×N and a possible general nonlinearity in
the coefficients aij (see [27]). A standard methodology,
when dealing with such complex system, is based on
model predictive control where instead of solving the con-
trol problem over the whole time horizon, the system is
approximated by an iterative solution over a sequence of
finite time steps [28].
2.2 Instantaneous control
We derive a feedback control u based on a finite time hori-
zon strategy. This feedback control will in general only
be suboptimal. Rigorous results on the properties of u for
quadratic cost functional and linear and nonlinear dynam-
ics are available, for example, in [28]. The receding horizon
framework applied here is also called instantaneous control
in the engineering literature.
Following the approach in [24], we assume a finite time
horizon ∆t ≤ 1 and in a time-discrete setting with times
tn = n∆t we consider the problem
wn+1i = w
n
i +
∆t
N
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − wni ) +∆tuni . (4)
In this case we are led to minimize the cost functional
J∆t(w, u) =
1
2N
N∑
j=1
(
Lj(w
n+1) + ν|unj |2
)
. (5)
Let us first consider the case of a quadratic cost functional,
namely (3) in the case m = 2.
The necessary optimality conditions (which can be
obtained by direct differentiation with respect to uni ) yield
∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
(
wn+1j − wn+1k
)(
δij − δik
)
+
ν
N
uni = 0,
where as usual δij denotes the Kronecker delta.
Solving for the controls uni we get
uni = −
2∆t
νN
N∑
j=1
(
wn+1i − wn+1j
)
= −2∆t
ν
(
wn+1i − w¯n+1
)
,
(6)
where w¯n+1 =
∑N
j=1 w
n+1
j /N denotes the mean wealth of
the agents at time (n+ 1)∆t. Note that the above controls
satisfy the identity
N∑
i=1
uni = −
2∆t
ν
N∑
i=1
(
wn+1i − w¯n+1
)
= 0,
which implies that all taxes are redistributed among
agents.
Using the discrete dynamics (4) we finally obtain the
explicit expressions
uni = −
2∆t
ν + 2∆t2
×
wni − w¯n + ∆tN
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − wni )
− ∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
akj(w
n
j − wnk )
 . (7)
Expression (7) furnishes a feedback control for the fully
discretized problem, which can be plugged as an instan-
taneous control into (4). Note, however, that the instan-
taneous control (7) in the discretized dynamics (4) is of
order O(∆t). In order to obtain an effective contribution
of the control in the dynamics we will make some further
natural assumptions. First, we assume that the penaliza-
tion parameter ν scales with the time discretization as
ν = 2γ∆t. This is consistent with the idea that for very
short time horizons we need a stronger control to achieve
the desired goal. Second, if one agrees with the fact that
a control on wealth has to depend also on the frequency
and intensity of interactions, one is lead to assume that the
parameter γ has to depend on the sum A of the exchange
parameters aij , and it is inversely proportional to A. This
guarantees that, in absence of exchanges in the system,
the control on wealth looses its meaning.
In this way the instantaneous controls reads
uni = −
1
γ +∆t
wni − w¯n + ∆tN
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − wni )
−∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
akj(w
n
j − wnk )
 . (8)
In the above setting, if we assume aij = aji, the mean
wealth is conserved, so that w¯n+1 = w¯, and the minimiza-
tion of the functional J∆t(w, u) corresponds to minimize
the quadratic inequality indicator
G2 =
∑N
j,k=1(wj − wk)2
2N2w¯2
. (9)
Note that a standard indicator of wealth inequality, closely
related to the one above, is the Gini coefficient, defined as
G1 =
∑N
j,k=1 |wj − wk|
2N2w¯
. (10)
In our setting, minimization of the Gini coefficient corre-
sponds to the cost functional (3) for m = 1. Analogous
computations show that this choice leads to the feedback
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control
uni = −
2∆t
νN
N∑
j=1
(wn+1i − wn+1j )
|wn+1i − wn+1j |
, (11)
where again we have
∑
i u
n
i = 0 and therefore all taxes
are redistributed. In this case, however, even using the
expression of the dynamic (4) it is not possible to give
an explicit expression to the above control term. Similar
conclusions are obtained for m > 2.
Remark 1. A more realistic dynamic typically includes
a random part into the evolution of the wealth system,
which now reads
w˙i(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij(wj − wi) + ηiwi + ui,
wi(t = 0) = wi,0 ≥ 0. (12)
In (12), the ηi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote a sequence of inde-
pendent and identically distributed random variables such
that 〈ηi〉 = 0 and 〈η2i 〉 = σ, where 〈·〉 denotes mathemat-
ical expectation. The additional random part represents
risks which are always present in economic trades [5]. It is
reasonable, however, to assume that the control could act
only on the deterministic part of the evolution.
2.3 Control of binary interactions
The special case N = 2 describes binary interactions.
Binary interactions are at the basis of the kinetic descrip-
tion of wealth distribution in multi-agent systems [5]. In
absence of risky components we obtain
wn+1i = w
n
i +∆t a¯ij(w
n
j − wni ) +∆tu(wni , wnj ),
(13)
wn+1j = w
n
j +∆t a¯ji(w
n
i − wnj ) +∆tu(wnj , wni ),
where a¯ij = aij/2 for every i 6= j.
In the case of a quadratic cost functional we have
u(wni , w
n
j ) = −
1
γ +∆t
×
(
1
2
(wni −wnj ) +
∆t
2
(a¯ij+a¯ji)(w
n
j −wni )
)
.
(14)
Note that in the above formulation both the dynamics
as well as the control functional operate at the level of
the binary interaction pair (wi, wj). Note again that the
binary dynamics preserves the local mean wealth if and
only if a¯ij = a¯ji. If we now define p = ∆t a¯ij , q = ∆t a¯ji
we can write the controlled binary Boltzmann dynamics
for the pair (v, w) in the form
v∗ = v + p(w − v) +∆tu(v, w),
w∗ = w + q(v − w) +∆tu(w, v), (15)
with
u(v, w) =
1
2(γ +∆t)
(1− p− q)(w − v). (16)
Collecting all terms together, and setting
β =
∆t
γ +∆t
, (17)
the binary relations (15) can be rewritten as
v∗ = v +
(
p+
β
2
(1− p− q)
)
(w − v) = v + p˜(w − v),
w∗ = w +
(
q +
β
2
(1− p− q)
)
(v − w) = w + q˜(v − w).
(18)
Hence, we observe that in the binary case the feedback
control can be reformulated as a modification of the origi-
nal mixing coefficients of the binary interaction. Note that,
since by definition both p and q are less than one, and
0 < β < 1 (where β = 0 coincides with absence of con-
trol and β = 1 yields maximum control), the new mixing
coefficients p˜ and q˜ still satisfy 0 < p˜, q˜ < 1.
It is interesting to consider the model predictive control
approximation originated by the minimization of the cost
functional for m = 1 in the case of binary interactions. In
this case, in fact, assuming ν = 2γ∆t we have the implicit
control definition
u(wni , w
n
j ) = −
1
2γ
(wn+1i − wn+1j )
|wn+1i − wn+1j |
. (19)
Now setting znij = w
n
i − wnj from the binary interaction
dynamic (13) we obtain the nonlinear equation
zn+1ij = z
n
ij(1−∆t(a¯ij − a¯ji))−∆t
zn+1ij
γ|zn+1ij |
.
It is easy to verify that the above equation admits a
solution only for
|znij | ≥
∆t
γ(1−∆t(a¯ij − a¯ji)) .
Now using the same notations as in (15) we have the
explicit feedback control
u(v, w) =

− 1
2γ
, v ≥ w + ∆t
γ(1− (p− q)) ,
1
2γ
, v ≤ w − ∆t
γ(1− (p− q)) ,
0, otherwise.
(20)
Therefore, a fixed taxation amount is applied to the richer
(and redistributed to the poorer) of the two agents only if
the difference in wealth is above a certain threshold. Note
that, the taxation process is such that v∗ ≥ 0 and w∗ ≥ 0
and that the resulting dynamic cannot be reformulated
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as a modification of the original mixing coefficients of the
binary interaction as in (18).
3 Boltzmann models for wealth distribution
with control
The basic model discussed in this section has been intro-
duced in 2005 in [12] within the framework of classical
models of wealth distribution in economy, to understand
the possible formation of heavy tails, as predicted by the
economic analysis of the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto
[11]. This model belongs to a class of models in which
the interacting agents are indistinguishable. In most of
these models an agent’s state at any instant of time t ≥ 0
is completely characterized by his current wealth v ≥ 0
[3,4]. When two agents encounter in a trade, their pre-
trade wealths v, w change into the post-trade wealths v∗,
w∗ according to the rule [13,14]
v∗ = p1v + q1w, w∗ = q2v + p2w.
The interaction coefficients pi and qi are non-negative
random variables. While q1 denotes the fraction of the
second agent’s wealth transferred to the first agent, the
difference p1 − q2 is the relative gain (or loss) of wealth of
the first agent due to market risks. It is usually assumed
that pi and qi have fixed laws, which are independent of
v and w, and of time. This means that the amount of
wealth an agent contributes to a trade is (on the average)
proportional to the respective agent’s wealth.
3.1 The control of the Cordier-Pareschi-Toscani
(CPT) model
In [12] the trade has been modelled to include the idea
that wealth changes hands for a specific reason: one agent
intends to invest his wealth in some asset, property etc.
in possession of his trade partner. Typically, such invest-
ments bear some risk, and either provide the buyer with
some additional wealth, or lead to the loss of wealth in
a non-deterministic way. An easy realization of this idea
consists in coupling a constant saving propensity param-
eter [13,14] with some risky investment that yields an
immediate gain or loss proportional to the current wealth
of the investing agent
v∗ = v +
1− λ
2
(w − v) + η1v,
w∗ = w +
1− λ
2
(v − w) + η2w,
(21)
where 0 < λ < 1 is the parameter which identifies the
saving propensity, namely the intuitive behavior which
prevents the agent to put in a single trade the whole
amount of his money. In this case
pi =
1 + λ
2
+ ηi, qi =
1− λ
2
(i = 1, 2).
As specified above, the coefficients η1, η2 are ran-
dom parameters, which are independent of v and
w, and distributed so that always v∗, w∗ ≥ 0, i.e.
η1, η2 ≥ −(1 + λ)/2.
Owing to classical arguments of kinetic theory [5], it
has been shown in [12] that the evolution of the wealth
density consequent to the binary interactions (21) obeys a
Boltzmann-type equation. Let us denote with f(v, t) the
distribution of the agents wealth v ≥ 0 at time t > 0.
Then, the equation for the evolution of f(v, t) can be fruit-
fully written in weak form. It corresponds to say that, for
any smooth function φ, f satisfies the equation
d
dt
∫
R+
φ(v)f(v, t)dv =
1
2
〈∫
R+×R+
f(v, t)f(w, t)
(
φ(v∗))
+φ(w∗)− φ(v)− φ(w)) dvdw〉 .
(22)
A simple computation shows that, unless the random vari-
ables are centered, i.e. 〈η1〉 = 〈η2〉 = 0, the mean wealth is
not preserved, but it increases or decreases exponentially
(see the computations in [12]). For centered ηi,
〈v∗ + w∗〉 = (1 + 〈η1〉)v + (1 + 〈η2〉)w = v + w,
implying conservation of the average wealth, so that
m(f) =
∫
R+
vf(v, t) dv = m(f0).
Various specific choices for the ηi have been discussed
in [29]. The easiest one leading to interesting results is
ηi = ±µ, where each sign comes with probability 1/2. The
factor µ ∈ (0, λ) should be understood as the intrinsic risk
of the market: it quantifies the fraction of wealth agents
are willing to gamble on. Within this choice, one can dis-
play the various regimes for the steady state of wealth
in dependence of λ and µ, which follow from numerical
evaluation. In the zone corresponding to low market risk,
the wealth distribution shows again socialistic behavior
with slim tails. Increasing the risk, one falls into capital-
istic, where the wealth distribution displays the desired
Pareto tail. A minimum of saving (λ > 1/2) is necessary
for this passage; this is expected since if wealth is spent too
quickly after earning, agents cannot accumulate enough to
become rich. Inside the capitalistic zone, the Pareto index
decreases from +∞ at the border with socialist zone to
unity. Finally, one can obtain a steady wealth distribution
which is a Dirac delta located at zero. Both risk and saving
propensity are so high that a marginal number of individ-
uals manages to monopolize all of the society’s wealth.
In the long-time limit, these few agents become infinitely
rich, leaving all other agents truly pauper. One obtains
four zones as depicted in Figure 1. Note that Zone 1 is
not allowed since |µ| < λ.
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Zone I
Not allowed
Zone II
Slim Tails
Zone III
Pareto Tails
Zone IV
Condensation
0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
µ
λ
Fig. 1. Parameter ranges with different tail regimes in the CPT model in the λ-µ-plane.
Using the notations of Section 2.3 we can solve the
control problem for the CPT-model with risk
v∗∗ = v + p(w − v) +∆tu(v, w) +∆t η1v,
w∗∗ = w + q(v − w) +∆tu(w, v) +∆t η2w, (23)
where
p = q = ∆t
1− λ
2
= α(1− λ), α = ∆t
2
. (24)
In the case of a quadratic cost functional we obtain as
feedback control on the deterministic part the value
u(v, w) =
β
4α
(1− 2α(1− λ)) (w − v). (25)
Consequently the post-control interaction (18) has deter-
ministic interaction coefficients
p˜ = α(1− λ) + β
2
(1− 2α(1− λ)) = β
2
+ α(1− λ)(1− β).
(26)
Finally, if we assume ∆t = 1 (α = 1/2), we can write the
controlled binary interactions
v∗∗ = v +
(
1− λ(1− β)
2
)
(w − v) + η1v,
w∗∗ = w +
(
1− λ(1− β)
2
)
(v − w) + η2w,
(27)
where now β = 1/(1 + γ). Note that negative values of the
wealth are now avoided if µ ∈ (0, λ(1 − β)) for λ(1 − β)
> 1/2. This gives an upper bound for the maximum
admissible control β < 1− 1/(2λ).
In a similar way, if we consider the explicit control
obtained for the cost functional (3) for m = 1 using (17)
we have for deterministic part of the CPT model
u(v, w) =

− β
4α(1− β) , v ≥ w +
β
(1− β) ,
β
4α(1− β) , v ≤ w −
β
(1− β) ,
0, otherwise.
(28)
In presence of noise positivity of the wealth is guaranteed
for µ ∈ (0, λ/2) and all values of β < 1 are admissible. It
should be noted, however, that large values of β implies a
stronger control but over a smaller number of agents (see
Fig. 2, left).
3.2 Control and Pareto tails
The formation of stationary states and their properties
have been systematically investigated in [3,29]. We briefly
recall the main results. The stationary curve f∞(w) satis-
fies the Pareto law with index r, provided that f∞ decays
like an inverse power function for large w,
f∞(w) ∝ w−(r+1) as w → +∞. (29)
More precisely, f∞ has Pareto index r ∈ [1,+∞) if the
moments
Ms :=
∫
R+
ws f∞(w) dw (30)
are finite for all positive s < r, and infinite for s > r. If all
Ms are finite (e.g. for a Gamma distribution), then f∞ is
said to possess a slim tail.
One studies the evolution equation for the moments
Ms(t) :=
∫
R+
ws f(w, t) dw, (31)
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Fig. 2. The different feedback controls for m = 1 (left) and m = 2 (right) for various values of the penalization parameter β.
Here α = 1/2 and λ = 1.
which is obtained by integration of (22) against
φ(w) = ws,
d
dt
Ms(t) =
1
2
∫
R+×R+
〈φ(v∗) + φ(w∗)〉f(v, t)f(w, t) dv dw
−Ms(t) =: Q+[φ]−Ms(t). (32)
Using an elementary inequality for x, y ≥ 0, s ≥ 1,
xs+ys ≤ (x+y)s ≤ xs+ys+2s−1(xys−1 +xs−1y), (33)
one calculates for the right-hand side of (32)
S(s)Ms(t) ≤ Q+[φ]−Ms(t) ≤ S(s)Ms(t)
+ 2s−2
2∑
i=1
〈piqs−1i + ps−1i qi〉MM1−1/ss (t),
(34)
where S is the characteristic function given by
S(s) = 1
2
( 2∑
i=1
〈psi + qsi 〉
)
− 1. (35)
Solving (32) with (34), one finds that either Ms(t) remains
bounded for all times when S(s) < 0, or it diverges like
exp[tS(s)] when S(s) > 0, respectively.
The function S is convex in s > 0 and S(0) = 1. It has a
trivial root in s = 1 (due to the conservation in the mean
property). It may have another non-trivial root, either in
(1,∞) or in (0, 1). There are three distinct cases: (i) If
s = 1 is the only root and S(s) < 0 for all s > 1, then all
moments are bounded, and the steady state distribution
has an exponential tail; (ii) if a non-trivial root s = r in
(1,∞) exists, moments up to the rth moment are bounded
and the steady state distribution has a Pareto tail; (iii)
if S(r) = 0 for some 0 < r < 1, then f∞(w) = δ0(w), a
Dirac at w = 0. For further details, we refer to [3,29], we
also refer to [30] for more complicated wealth-condensed
distributions [30].
We now illustrate the effect of the instantaneous con-
trol in the quadratic case (25) on the formation of the
Pareto tail. Figure 3 shows the effect of the control on
the formation of tails in the CPT model for different
parameters λ and µ.
The left plot shows the uncontrolled case. It is obtained
by numerical evaluation of the characteristic function S.
In Zone II, s = 1 is the only root and S(s) < 0 for all
s > 1, hence all moments are bounded, and the steady
state distribution has an exponential tail. In Zone III, a
non-trivial root s = r in (1,∞) exists, and moments up
to the rth moment are bounded, i.e. the steady state dis-
tribution has a Pareto tail. The color coding in Zone III
indicates the increasing Pareto tail index, increasing from
darker blue (r close to one) to lighter blue as r increases
and to yellow as r →∞. In Zone IV, there is a non-trivial
root in (0, 1), and condensation occurs: the steady state
is a delta distribution at zero.
We can similarly consider the controlled case, and
numerically evaluate the characteristic function with mod-
ified mixing parameters. The right plot in Figure 3 shows
the effect of the control. As the control is applied the
region with slim tails (Zone II) is enlarged, while the zone
with Pareto tails (Zone III) is shifted towards the conden-
sation zone (Zone IV). The dashed green curves indicate
the position of the contours in the uncontrolled case for
comparison.
4 Quasi invariant limits
4.1 Controlled limit Fokker–Planck equation
The analysis of [29] essentially shows that the microscopic
interaction (21) considered in [12] is such that the kinetic
equation (22) is able to describe all interesting behaviours
of wealth distribution in a multiagent society.
By assuming
1− λ
2
= ελ0, 〈η2i 〉 = εσ, τ = εt, (36)
and a unitary average value of the initial density, it has
been shown in [12] that the scaled density h(v, τ) = f(v, t)
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Fig. 3. Different tail regimes in the CPT model in the λ-µ-plane for the uncontrolled (β = 0, left) and controlled (quadratic
cost functional, β = 0.06, right) case. The color coding in Zone III indicates the increasing Pareto tail index, increasing from
darker blue (r close to one) to lighter blue as r increases and to yellow as r →∞. Dashed green curves in the right plot indicate
the position of the contours for the uncontrolled case (β = 0) for comparison.
satisfies in the limit ε→ 0 the Fokker–Planck equation
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+ λ0
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h) . (37)
It is immediately recognizable that equation (37) has a
unique stationary solution of unit mass, given by the
Γ -like distribution [12,31]
h∞(v) =
(r − 1)r
Γ (r)
exp
(− r−1v )
v1+r
, (38)
where
r = 1 + 2
λ0
σ
> 1.
This stationary distribution exhibits a power-law tail for
large values of the wealth variable.
The limit procedure induced by the scaling (36), called
quasi-invariant limit of the kinetic equation (22), cor-
responds to the situation in which are prevalent the
exchanges of wealth which produce an extremely small
modification the pre-interaction wealths (grazing interac-
tions), but we are waiting enough time to still see the
effects.
By using the same scaling in the controlled interactions
(23) for ∆t = 1, we formally obtain in the limit ε→ 0 the
Fokker–Planck equation
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+λ0
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h)+ ∂
∂v
(U [h]h) , (39)
where
U [h](v, τ) =
∫
R+
h(w, τ)u0(v, w) dw, (40)
and u0(v, w) is the limiting value of the scaled control.
More precisely, by further assuming β = νε, in the
quadratic cost case we have
u0(v, w) =
ν
2
(v − w), (41)
which gives U [h](v, τ) = ν(v − 1)/2. Clearly, we obtain
the same Fokker–Planck equation (37) where now λ0 is
replaced by
λ1 = λ0 + ν/2. (42)
Since the variance of the steady state is decreasing with
respect to λ,
V (h∞) =
σ
2λ0 − σ ,
whenever λ1 > λ0 in terms of variance the control
improves the distribution of wealth towards equality.
At variance, a control based on minimizing the Gini
functional for m = 1 leads to
u0(v, w) =

2ν, v ≥ w + ν,
−2ν, v ≤ w − ν,
0, otherwise.
(43)
In this latter case, however, the limiting equation has a
different structure with respect to (37) and we cannot
compute explicitly the steady state.
4.2 Taxation-redistribution and limit Fokker–Planck
equation
The CPT model with taxation and redistribution has been
proposed in [16]. There, taxation was acting on interac-
tions (21) to take away a percentage δ of the trade wealth,
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to give
v′ = v(1− δ) + 1− λ
2
(w − v) + η1v,
w′ = w(1− δ) + 1− λ
2
(v − w) + η2w.
(44)
Then, the wealth taken away was redistributed according
to some redistribution policy, given by a redistribution
operator of the form
Rδχ(f)(v, t) = δ
∂
∂v
[
(χv − (χ+ 1)m(t)) f(v, t)
]
. (45)
Here, m(t) denotes the first moment of f , which, in
general, makes the operator Rδχ nonlinear. Hence, in pres-
ence of taxation and redistribution, the weak form of the
CPT-model takes the form
d
dτ
∫
R+
φ(v)f(v, τ)dv = δ
∫
R+
φ(v)Rδχ(f)(v, t) dv
+
1
2
〈∫
R+×R+
f(v, τ)f(w, τ)
(
φ(v′) + φ(w′)
−φ(v)− φ(w)) dvdw〉 . (46)
Note that, by construction, the mean wealth in the system
is preserved by equation (46).
The weight factor multiplying the distribution function
inside the square brackets in (45) has been taken to be
linear in v for simplicity, also in order to involve in the
mechanism only the most meaningful moments, those of
order zero and one. Such a weight function contains only
one disposable real parameter χ, a constant that charac-
terizes the type of redistribution, and that determines the
slope of the straight line as well as the value of v, whether
physical or non-physical, at which the weight itself van-
ishes. For χ > 0 the redistribution acts in order to reduce
inequalities proportionally to the distance from the mean
wealth m(t). The other parameter has been determined by
the constraint that the redistribution operator preserves
the number of agents and actually redistributes the total
amount of money that is being collected by taxation. Fur-
ther details on the redistribution operator can be found
in [5,16].
In a very recent paper [15] the quasi-invariant limit of
the kinetic equation (46) has been considered under the
same scaling (36), by further assuming that δ = κε. The
resulting Fokker–Planck equation is now
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+ λ2
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h) , (47)
λ2 = λ0 + κ(χ+ 1). (48)
Note that λ2 > λ0 whenever χ > −1. In this case, the
effect of the taxation and redistribution is to improve the
distribution of wealth towards equality.
In the case of a quadratic cost functional, apart from the
different meaning of the parameters appearing in (42) and
(48), both control and taxation with redistribution have
the same effect on the quasi-invariant limit of the CPT
model, namely to increase the value of the coefficient of
the drift operator in the resulting Fokker–Planck equation,
thus giving a stationary distribution with smaller variance
with respect to the original one. Interestingly enough, at
least at the level of the Fokker–Planck equation, the effect
of the taxation and redistribution (the constant λ2) can
be obtained by an instantaneous optimal control of the
binary interaction simply imposing that the penalization
is chosen to give λ1 = λ2. This gives the identity
ν = 2κ(1 + χ). (49)
From this point of view, the conjecture by Piketty [1] is
verified at the level of this simple kinetic model.
5 A numerical comparison
In this section we first compare the effects of the different
control mechanisms induced by different cost functionals
in our feedback controlled kinetic models and then ana-
lyze the behavior of the kinetic model with local control
originated by a quadratic cost functional with the kinetic
model based on a global redistribution mechanism. All
models have been solved using a direct Monte Carlo sim-
ulation method (see [5] for more details). The noise term
has been taken as ηi = ±µ, where each sign comes with
probability 1/2. Therefore, we have 〈η2i 〉 = µ2 in (36).
The number of simulated sample agents has been fixed to
N = 5×104 and standard averaging procedures have been
used after the steady state has been reached to reduce the
statistical fluctuations.
5.1 Test 1. The effects of different feedback controls
First we compare the effects of the different control
induced by the choice of the cost functional in (3). More
precisely we compare the controlled kinetic model (cCPT)
defined by (23) where the feedback control is defined by
(25) for m = 2 and by (28) for m = 1. We fix the strength
of noise µ = 0.25 and select λ = 0.95. With these choices
we are in the power law asymptotic region of the CPT
model (see Fig. 1). The maximum admissible control value
for β is about 0.47 for m = 2. Initially each sample agent
has a wealth w = 1 so that f0(w) = δ(1). The results are
reported in Figure 4 for β = 0.2 and β = 0.4. Both controls
mechanisms provide a marked reduction of inequalities
in the system, in particular the reduction of the Pareto
index in the power law tail is proportional to the penal-
ization term β and comparable in the two models (see
Fig. 4, left). On the other hand, the effects of the differ-
ent controls processes are clearly evident for lower values
of the wealth. Increasing β for m = 1 implies a taxa-
tion/redistribution process for larger differences in wealth
(accordingly to Fig. 2) which as a results gives less oppor-
tunities for agents with low wealth values to benefit of the
inequality reduction process.
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Fig. 4. Test 1. Behavior of the controlled (cCPT) model in the case m = 1 and m = 2 for various values of β. Here µ = 0.25
and λ = 0.95. Asymptotic behavior of the solution in loglog scale (left) and corresponding Lorentz curves (right).
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Fig. 5. Test 2. Behavior of the controlled (cCPT) for m = 2 and redistributed (rCPT) models for various values of β. Here
µ = 0.25, λ = 0.95, δ = λβ/2, χ = 0. Asymptotic behavior of the solution in loglog scale (left) and corresponding Lorentz curves
(right).
Next, to emphasize the reduction of wealth inequality
in Figure 4 (right) we have also plotted the Lorentz curve
defined as
L(F (w)) =
∫ w
0
f∞(v)v dv, F (w) =
∫ w
0
f∞(v) dv,
since we have
∫∞
0
f∞(v)v dv = 1. The Gini coefficient G1
in (10) can then be thought of as the ratio of the area
that lies between the line of equality (the line y = x of
perfect equality) and the Lorenz curve over the total area
under the line of equality. In our test case we have a value
of G1 ≈ 0.46 in the uncontrolled case. For β = 0.2 it is
quite evident that the feedback control with m = 1 yields
a stronger reduction of the Gini coefficient (G1 ≈ 0.3 for
m = 2 and G1 ≈ 0.28 for m = 1), whereas for β = 0.4 the
two control gives analogous results (G1 ≈ 0.25 for both
models).
5.2 Test 2. Local control and global redistribution
Next we compare the kinetic model obtained by mini-
mization of a quadratic cost functional defined by (27)
with the corresponding model based on a global taxa-
tion/redistribution process in (44)–(45). The simulation
is performed in the quasi-invariant scaling defined by (36)
together with the further scaling β = νε and δ = κε. In all
test cases, the parameters in the two models are related by
assumption (49) so that in the limit ε→ 0 their solution
should coincide. We report the results obtained with the
different models for various values of the scaling param-
eter ε. In this way for ε = O(1) we can emphasize the
different behavior of the local control when compared to
a global redistribution policy, whereas for ε  1 we can
verify the asymptotic procedure that lead to the same
Fokker–Planck equation.
5.2.1 The ε = O(1) regime
In the first test case we compare the controlled (cCPT)
model for m = 2 and the redistributed (rCPT) model
in absence of scaling, or equivalently taking ε = 1. We
set µ = 0.25 and λ = 0.95 as in Test 1 and the same
initial data. For the redistributed model we fix δ =
λβ/2, so that the taxation process of the two models is
the same in each binary interaction, and choose χ = 0
so that the redistribution process is independent from
the wealth.
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Fig. 6. Test 2. Scaling limit of the controlled (cCPT) for m = 2
and redistributed (rCPT) models for various values of ε. Here
µ = 0.25, λ = 0.95, β = 0.15, δ = λβ/2, χ = 0. Asymptotic
behavior of the solution in loglog scale for small values of the
wealth.
As expected, with these choices the two models show
a rather similar behavior. The results of the correspond-
ing stationary solutions are reported in Figure 5 (left)
for β = 0, 0.15 and 0.3. The different slopes of the tails
clearly show how both models are capable to reduce the
inequalities in the wealth distribution. Note that the mod-
els behavior is different for small values of the wealth,
since in the redistributed model the density of agents with
wealth below δ is exactly equal to zero. In Figure 5 (right)
we report the corresponding Lorentz curves.
5.2.2 The limit ε→ 0
Finally, we consider the scaling process that leads from
the kinetic Boltzmann models to their corresponding
Fokker–Planck descriptions (39) and (47). We consider the
same data as before but for a fixed value of β = 0.15 and
various values of the scaling parameter ε = 0.1 and 0.01.
For this choice of parameters in the limit ε→ 0 we obtain
a Pareto index r = 1.8 in the uncontrolled case and r = 4.2
in the controlled case with β = 0.15.
The results are reported in Figure 6. Since for large
values of the wealth the two models give very similar
results and show the same power law behavior of the
limit Fokker–Planck model, to remark the differences
we considered a region of the density function close to
the left boundary w = 0. The convergence of the models
towards the analytic steady state of the Fokker–Planck
model is evident.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a possible alternative
to the standard taxation and redistribution rules, which
relies on a suitable control applied to the microscopic
trades describing the wealth distribution of a multi-agent
system. The constrained system is then approximated by a
finite time horizon strategy which allows to embed explic-
itly the control in the interaction rules. We emphasize
that the resulting form of the control is closely related to
the choice of the cost functional. Different cost function-
als originate different taxation/redistribution strategies.
We analyze in details the case of a cost functional which
aims at minimizing the variance of the wealth distribu-
tion and the case of a cost functional which minimizes
the well-known Gini coefficient. The corresponding kinetic
models based on binary interactions can then be derived
and show that the control is able to modify the cor-
responding Pareto tails. This can be further analyzed
with the aid of some numerical simulations by consider-
ing the corresponding quasi-invariant Fokker–Planck limit
and its relationship with previous models based on global
taxation and redistribution.
B. Du¨ring acknowledges support by the Leverhulme Trust
research project grant Novel discretisations for higher-order
nonlinear PDE (RPG-2015-69). L. Pareschi acknowledges the
support of the MIUR-DAAD program Mean field games for
socio economic problems. G. Toscani acknowledges the support
of the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research
(MIUR): Dipartimenti di Eccellenza Program (2018–2022) -
Dept. of Mathematics “F. Casorati”, University of Pavia.
Author contribution statement
Each author has contributed equally to the theoretical
findings of this paper. The numerical experiments have
been realized by B. Du¨ring and L. Pareschi.
Open Access This is an open access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
References
1. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013)
2. P. Degond, J.-G. Liu, J. Stat. Phys. 154, 751 (2014)
3. B. Du¨ring, D. Matthes, G. Toscani, Phys. Rev. E 78,
056103 (2008)
4. B. Du¨ring, D. Matthes and G. Toscani. A Boltzmann-type
approach to the formation of wealth distribution curves.
Riv. Mat. Univ. Parma 8 1, 199 (2009)
5. L. Pareschi, G. Toscani, Interacting Multiagent Systems:
Kinetic Equations and Monte Carlo Methods (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 2014)
6. J. Angle, Soc. Forces 65, 293 (1986)
7. E. Scalas, U. Garibaldi, S. Donadio, Eur. Phys. J. B 53,
267 (2006)
8. A. Draˇgulescu, V. Yakovenko, Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 723
(2000)
9. C. Cercignani, in The Boltzmann Equation and Its Appli-
cations (Springer Series in Applied Mathematical Sciences,
New York, 1988), Vol. 67
Page 12 of 12 Eur. Phys. J. B (2018) 91: 265
10. C. Cercignani, R. Illner, M. Pulvirenti, in The Mathemat-
ical Theory of Dilute Gases (Springer Series in Applied
Mathematical Sciences, New York, 1994), Vol. 106
11. V. Pareto, Cours d’e´conomie politique, Tome II Livre III
(F. Pichon Imprimeur-E´diteur, Paris, France, 1897)
12. S. Cordier, L. Pareschi, G. Toscani, J. Stat. Phys. 120,
253 (2005)
13. A. Chakraborti, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 13, 1315 (2002)
14. A. Chakraborti, B.K. Chakrabarti, Eur. Phys. J. B 17,
167 (2000)
15. M. Bisi, Boll. Unione Mat. Ital. 10, 143 (2017)
16. M. Bisi, G. Spiga, G. Toscani, Commun. Math. Sci. 7, 901
(2009)
17. G. Toscani, Europhys. Lett. 88, 10007 (2009)
18. L. Pareschi, G. Toscani, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A 372,
20130396 (2017)
19. B. Du¨ring, G. Toscani, Physica A 384, 493 (2007)
20. G. Toscani, Rend. Lincei Mat. Appl. 28, 451 (2017)
21. E. Perversi, E. Regazzini, Math. Models Methods Appl.
Sci. 26, 1735 (2016)
22. G. Albi, M. Herty, L. Pareschi, Commun. Math. Sci. 13,
1407 2015
23. G. Albi, L. Pareschi, M. Zanella, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A
372, 20140138 (2014)
24. G. Albi, L. Pareschi, G. Toscani, M. Zanella, Recent
advances in opinion modeling: control and social influence,
in Active Particles, Vol. 1: Theory, Models, Applications,
edited by N. Bellomo, P. Degond, E. Tadmor (Birkha¨user,
Boston, 2017), Chap. 2, pp. 49–98
25. M. Krstic, I. Kanellakopoulos, P.V. Kokotovic, Nonlinear
and Adaptive Control Design (John Wiley and Sons Inc.,
New York, 1995)
26. E. D. Sontag, Mathematical control theory, in Texts in
Applied Mathematics, 2nd edn. (Springer-Verlag, New
York, 1998), Vol. 6
27. M. Herty, S. Steffensen, L. Pareschi, Netw. Heterog. Media
10, 699 (2015)
28. E. Camacho, C. Bordons, Model Predictive Control
(Springer, USA, 2004)
29. D. Matthes, G. Toscani, J. Stat. Phys. 130, 1087
(2008)
30. A. Devitt-Lee, H. Wang, J. Li, B. Boghosian, SIAM J.
Appl. Math. 78, 996 (2017)
31. J.F. Bouchaud, M. Me´zard, Physica A 282, 536 (2000)
